'it is therefore plausible to suppose that this yield of pleasure corresponds to the psychical expenditure that is saved' (p. 167). The psychical energy that has thus been saved can be discharged in laughter. Freud's important principle of 'economy' has re-emerged; the secret of the pleasure derived from tendentious jokes is 'economy in expenditure on inhibition or suppression' (ibid.) But if, as Freud believes, tendentious jokes 'are able to release pleasure even from sources that have undergone repression' (p. 185), how exactly is this achieved? Take the urge one might have to insult a particular person. What would ordinarily prevent this urge from being acted upon, Freud suggests, might be the constraints put upon one by a feeling of propriety. Suppose, however, that instead of a bare-faced insult, a good joke can be made 'from the material of the words and thoughts used for the insult' (p. 187). In this way, a relatively small amount of pleasure may be generated from the technique of this joke. Freud thinks that this pleasure-the 'fore-pleasure' (p. 188)-acts as an 'incentive bonus' (ibid.) by means of which the 'suppressed purpose can ... gain sufficient strength to overcome the inhibition, which would otherwise be stronger than it' (p. 187). Once repression is thus overcome, and the veiled insult or sexual reference made, the 'incomparably greater' (ibid.) amount of pleasure derivable from the purpose, as opposed to the technique, can be released. Hence, overall, 'with the assistance of the offer of a small amount of pleasure, a much greater one, which would otherwise have been hard to achieve, has been gained' (p.188). In summary, to create or maintain an inhibition against sexual or hostile urges, we are told, we need to expend psychical energy. But when a tendentious joke allows us to circumvent the obstacle which stands in the way of the satisfaction of the sexual or hostile urge, the yield of pleasure we thereby obtain corresponds to the psychical expenditure that is saved, and this saved psychical energy then becomes available for discharge in laughter. In other words, the listener 'laughs with the quota of psychic energy which has become free through the lifting of the inhibitory cathexis; we might say that he laughs this quota off' (p. 201). Also, 'the expenditure economized corresponds exactly to the inhibition that has become superfluous' (ibid.). So much for tendentious jokes; what about the innocent variety? Freud explains this, too, in terms of our economising upon psychical expenditure. For instance, in plays upon words, such as those of the double entendre, he claims that our psychical attitude is focused upon the sound of a word rather than its meaning. We may therefore suspect, Freud thinks, that we save upon 'psychical work' in so doing.
Jokes, 'the comic' and 'humour'
In the last section of his book, Freud distinguishes 'jokes'-the topic of his discussion so far-from 'the comic' and 'humour'. 'The comic' is illustrated by 'the comic of movement' (p. 249)-such as the exaggerated antics of a clown-and 'the comic which is found in the intellectual functions and the character traits of other people' (ibid.). In the former case, says Freud, we recognize that these movements are exaggerated and inexpedient, and laugh as a result of comparing such movements with those which we ourselves would have made in similar circumstances. Freud thinks that the amount of energy that accompanies the process of thinking 'is larger when there is an idea of a large movement than when it is a question of a small one' (p. 252). Thus in thinking of exaggerated movement, I expend greater 'thinking energy'. And hence, in comparing the exaggerated movement with my own: my increased expenditure in order to understand it is inhibited in statu naseendi, as it were in the act of being mobilized; it is declared superfluous and is free for use elsewhere or perhaps for discharge by laughter. (p. 254)
Freud illustrates his second subclass with the kind of 'comic nonsense' (ibid.) produced by ignorant exam candidates. Here, we have precisely the opposite of the comedy of movement; a mental function, as opposed to a physical one, becomes laughable 'if the other person has spared himself expenditure which I regard as indispensable' (p. 255), as in the case of the incompetent examinee. Overall, we are told that 'a person appears comic to us if, in comparison with ourselves, he makes too great an expenditure on his bodily functions and too little on his mental ones' (p. 256). On the other hand, if this balance is reversed, 'we are filled with astonishment and admiration' (ibid.). Freud next discusses 'humour'. The greatest obstacle to the emergence of the comic is 'the release of distressing affects' (p. 293): pity, anger, pain, etc. In contrast, 'humour' emerges in situations where ordinarily we would release such an affect but where for some reason that affect is suppressed in statu nascendi. So the pleasure of humour arises 'at the cost of a release of affect that does not occur: it arises from an economy in the expenditure of affect' (ibid.). For example, take gallows humour (e.g. St Lawrence who, while being burned at the stake, requested: 'Turn me over; I'm done on that side'). The affect we would ordinarily feel here is pity, but as soon as we understand that the condemned man is capable of seeming unconcerned at his fate, our pity 'becomes unutilizable and we laugh it off' (p. 295). 'An economy of pity', Freud tells us, 'is one of the most frequent sources of humorous pleasure' (ibid.). In summary, then, the pleasure derived from jokes, the comic and humour, is all explicable in terms of an economy in expenditure :on inhibition in (tendentious) jokes; on 'ideation' or thinking in the comic; and on feeling in humour. And, as we might expect from Freud, there is an important link with childhood:
All three are agreed in representing methods of regaining from mental activity a pleasure which has in fact been lost through the development of that activity. For the euphoria which we endeavour to reach by these means is nothing other than the mood of a period of life in which we were accustomed to deal with our psychical work in general with a small expenditure of energy-the mood of our childhood, when we were ignorant of the comic, when we were incapable of jokes and when we had no need of humour to make us feel happy in our life. (p. 302) Problems with Freud's theory 'The purposes of jokes' 1 Let us begin our critique of Freud by recalling his claim that tendentious jokes generally produce more pleasure than innocent ones. Three points are worth making in connection with this. Firstly, this exemplifies the Freudian tendency to base his theory on a general view of humans which overlooks individual diversity. He ignores the vast differences in individuals' senses of humour. Many will be able to derive tremendous pleasure from innocent jokes; especially if we bear in mind something Freud admits: that innocent jokes need not be trivial; an innocent joke may 'be of great substance, it may assert something of value' (p. 134). Freud overlooks the pleasure, neither lustful nor hostile, which is obtainable from such jokes, as their hearer recognizes a profound truth. Also, Freud unjustifiably assumes both that the amount of pleasure derived from a joke is quantifiable, and also that it can be measured by the amount of laughter it generates. These assumptions are unwarranted, and ignore the many different levels of sophistication in jokes, and the corresponding different levels of pleasure taken therein. A more sophisticated pleasure -such as appreciating particularly clever wit -is not necessarily expressed in laughter. And yet we would be mistaken to think that this necessarily means the pleasure derived from such wit is less than that derived from the double entendre which, maybe due to social pressures to laugh at such jokes in certain company, one may greet with raucous laughter. Laughter is simply not an accurate measure of the degree of pleasure taken in a joke. Thirdly, Freud invalidly moves from the idea that tendentious jokes generally give more pleasure than innocent ones, to the claim that therefore 'tendentious jokes, by virtue of their purpose, must have sources of pleasure at their disposal to which innocent jokes have no access' (p. 140). This does not follow; Freud is reasoning from what generally tends to be the case, to a conclusion about the entire class of tendentious jokes. But what about tendentious jokes which are perceived as poor? Such jokes, by virtue of being tendentious, have purposes, which highly amusing innocent jokes do not. So if the greater pleasure usually derived from a tendentious joke is to be explained precisely in terms of purpose, what goes wrong in a poor tendentious joke: why, despite its having a purpose, is it poor? Freud's answer would presumably be that, in such a case, the technique of the joke is insufficiently good to offer sufficient 'forepleasure' to circumvent the obstacle which stands in the way of the satisfaction of the lustful or hostile instinct. But Freud's understanding of 'technique' renders this answer inadequate. We observed that Freud's 'techniques' are essentially just kinds of joke. For instance, there can be both innocent and tendentious 'double-meanings'. But what happens if someone prefers a witty innocent 'double-meaning' to a 'Carry On' double entendre? According to Freud, both jokes have the same technique: 'double-meaning'. In addition, the tendentious joke has a purpose. So how can the innocent joke possibly afford more pleasure? Clearly, in order to do so, it must have some quality which its tendentious rival lacks. Perhaps it is 'cleverer'; wittier. The 'cleverness' of jokes is an important factor in their appreciation, which Freud has overlooked. A 'doublemeaning' joke might appear 'clever' due to the sheer originality of the double-meaning used. One might prefer such a joke to its tendentious competitor on the grounds of this originality; something whose humorous potential one has never before seen tapped, as opposed to yet another sexual innuendo. If so, the different receptions our two jokes receive cannot adequately be explained in terms of technique. Or at least, not without a far more sophisticated understanding of 'technique'; one that takes into account factors such as the appreciation of a joke's 'cleverness'.
2 We can also question the limitations Freud places on the purposes of tendentious jokes; that they must be related either to, broadly, sexual or aggressive instincts. 3 There seems no reason to accept this. In particular, Max Eastman makes the point that sex and aggression can themselves be 'ideal standards against which some people are in suppressed revolt'. 4 For instance, take this Rodney Dangerfield gag: I said to my wife, "All things considered I think l'd like to die in bed". She said, "What, again?" A plausible explanation of the pleasure taken by males in such a joke might be in terms of empathy with Dangerfield, and the attainment of a momentary release from a certain social pressure to live up to an ideal of sexual potency.
repartee is a much-admired quality. To to be on the receiving end of such repartee, therefore, can have the effect of making one feel one has been made to look ridiculous; the idea that it is a witty comment at one's expense will often be uppermost in one's mind. Therefore, for the joker who makes fun of his 'superiors', this joking is a far more risky business than Freud allows; there is no telling what resentment this may foster in someone who cannot 'take a joke' (even if they recognize the need to appear to do so), and hence of what damaging repercussions may result from their taking their revenge at a later date. The interesting question that arises from this is what it is about the pleasure derivable from joking which sometimes makes such a risk seem irresistible. Yet to this Freud offers no answer.
'The mechanism of pleasure'
4 There are big problems with this crucial aspect of Freud's theory, which seems highly speculative. It is hard to see what would count as evidence for the claim that psychical expenditure is needed to create or maintain inhibitions; or that the pleasure yielded from tendentious jokes 'corresponds to the psychic expenditure that is saved' (p. 167). Why is the latter, especially, supposed to be 'plausible'? As Wittgenstein said of Freud's theory of dreams, 'the reason why he calls one sort of analysis the right one, does not seem to be a matter of evidence'.5 The reader could be forgiven for feeling similar puzzlement about his theory of joking. Take, for instance, one of Freud's classes of innocent jokes; that of 'faulty reasoning', absurdity and nonsense. One of the pleasures of nonsense verse is in trying, and failing, to make sense of it. Intuitively, it would seem that trying and failing to do so would involve greater psychical expenditure than instantaneously making sense of something in the usual way. Yet this is precisely the opposite of what Freud claims; in enjoying nonsense, we are supposed to save psychical energy by being released from the constraints of having to think logically or put thoughts together so as to make sense. Moreover, John Morreall has pointed out that part of Freud's argument in this regard that concerning the comedy of exaggerated movement-is downright incoherent. Remember that in laughter at the comic we are supposed to save 'thinking' energy. The energy summoned to understand an exaggerated physical movement, Freud claimed, is greater than that required to understand the movement one would need to make oneself in order to achieve the same end. So the increased expenditure required to understand the first is rendered superfluous and discharged in laughter. But in what sense is it superfluous? In order for the comparison upon which Freud's case depends to take place, the energy required to understand each movement must actually be expended; otherwise we would have no way of knowing that the movement at which we laugh is exaggerated. 6 So while Freud's line of reasoning previously seemed merely implausible, in the case of the comedy of exaggerated movement it seems totally incoherent.
5 The notion of 'fore-pleasure' is also problematic. We can question, as does Richard Wollheim, how the fore-pleasure is of sufficient strength to make sure that an inhibition is lifted. 7 Fore-pleasure, remember, is that derived from the technique alone of a tendentious joke. Freud admits that this is a 'small amount' (p. 188) of pleasure. And yet we are asked to believe that it is sufficient to overcome, at least momentarily, deep-rooted inhibitions. It is very difficult to see why. And given the importance of the notion of forepleasure in Freud's account, this is a major problem.
'The comic' and 'humour' comedy of movement, there are further problems with his discussions of 'the comic' and 'humour'. His determination to explain everything in terms of differences in psychic energy makes his discussion of the comic in character look reductionist and highly implausible. The claim that a character is comic to the extent that he expends, in comparison to oneself, more energy on the physical and less on the mental, is unsupportable. Who expends more energy on the mental, via his daydreaming, and is comic because of it, than James Thurber's Walter Mitty? Moreover, Freud's example here, of laughter at the ignorant exam candidate, is particularly bad. Precisely the opposite of what Freud claims is true. If the pleasure is derived from an enjoyment of one's superiority over those more ignorant than oneself-a form of Schadenfreude, basically -this may be heightened if the person at whom one laughs puts in considerable mental expenditure in order to produce the 'comic nonsense' which constitutes his answers. The candidate who tries hard and produces rubbish is more comic than he who, realizing he cannot do the exam, spends just half an hour and n1inimal psychical expenditure writing his 'comic nonsense' and then, with a carefree attitude, walks out. Indeed, the candidate who has studied hard and yet is finding the exam difficult, although he will do much better" than the carefree student, may even feel a sneaking 'astonishment and admiration' for his lazier, more laid-back colleague, whereas this is what we are supposed to feel for those whose mental expenditure is greater than our own.
7 Furthermore, to stress differences in psychical energy is to explain inadequately cases of 'the comic' which depend upon shared experiences and predicaments in life. Often a character is comic not because of any difference between the amount of his mental 01" physical expenditure and ours, but because he finds himself in the same predicament that we have done. 01" alternatively, as Morreall suggests, when we see him in a predicament which we have never experienced, we laugh precisely because we recognize that if we were in such a predicament, we would have no alternative but to act in the same way as he does. Consider a farce in which a semi-naked lover, hiding on a window ledge until the coast is clear, rinds himself locked out and has to find a way of reaching safety. If we find this amusing, this can be explained either by Schadenfreude, or by empathy with the lover and his predicament, depending upon our attitudes towards adultery and to that particular character. There is no reason to suppose, however, that our amusement depends in any way upon perceiving any difference between the lover's psychic expenditure and what our own would be.
